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Worker Responses to Shirking 
under Shared Capitalism
Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, 
and Joseph R. Blasi
What do workers do when they see someone slacking oﬀ in ways that reduce 
the productivity of their work group and enterprise?
The rational response depends on the circumstances. In a tournament 
race for promotion, having a competitor slack oﬀ is good news. You do not 
have to go all out to win the promotion. In a piece- rate pay system where the 
ﬁ  rm lowers the rate per piece when workers produce more than expected, 
you will also welcome the shirker. The more other workers shirk, the less 
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likely it is that management will lower the rate per piece and make it harder 
to earn your weekly pay.
But when part of workers’ pay comes in the form of some group incentive 
such as proﬁ  t sharing or share ownership or stock options, a worker who 
does not do his or her job takes “money out of the pocket” of other work-
ers. The group would be better oﬀ if someone acted against the shirker. But 
standard analysis suggests that it will rarely be rational for anyone to inter-
vene. The costs of intervening with the shirker fall on the intervener but that 
person gets only part of the beneﬁ  t (in an N worker group the worker who 
intervenes gains 1/ Nth of the beneﬁ  t going to workers and none of the ben-
eﬁ  t that goes to capital). The implication is that rational workers will not act 
against a shirker just as rational players should not cooperate in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Group incentive systems are thus doomed to failure.
The facts for labor practices as for prisoner’s dilemma and other games 
of cooperation are diﬀerent. Team production and group incentive plans, 
which succeed only if they overcome free riding and shirking, are wide-
spread in modern economies. Since workers often have better information 
than management on what fellow workers are doing, worker responses to 
shirking are critical to the success or failure of these schemes. Many work-
places develop cultures where workers discourage others from shirking. 
Lab experiments ﬁ  nd cooperative behavior in collective goods games when 
game theory rationality predicts that the rational player defects. Directly 
relevant to our analysis, Fehr and Gachter (2000) have found that individu-
als punish defectors in laboratory experiments even when it is not in their 
individual self-  interest to do so, due to norms of reciprocity that are strong 
among many individuals. Peer monitoring has also been found in group 
loans in Third World credit markets (Stiglitz 1990). Punishing free riders at 
a workplace may also beneﬁ  t the intervener in the long run if other members 
of the group appreciate that person’s action against free riders. They may 
reap long-  term rewards in the form of higher esteem and greater inﬂ  uence 
within a group. Self-  interest aside, the evidence from anthropologists that 
voluntarily “policing” cooperation occurs in many societies suggests that 
it may be hardwired from evolution. Some economists have suggested how 
ostracism can be eﬀective in promoting cooperation (Hirshleifer and Ras-
mussen 1989). It is also worth noting that to the extent shirking occurs, it is 
not conﬁ  ned to group incentive systems. Shirking may happen in virtually 
every workplace.
This study examines worker reactions to shirking by analyzing questions 
on the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS) and the NBER surveys 
of fourteen companies that have some forms of group incentive plans. We 
asked workers about the ease of observing co- workers’ performance, and the 
likelihood of responding to poor work performance. Our analysis of these 
questions, together with questions about incentive systems, ﬁ  rm human 
resource policies, and other aspects of the workplace, show:Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    7 9
1.  Most workers believe that they can readily detect shirking by fellow 
employees.
2.  Workers are most likely to take action against shirkers in workplaces 
where employees are paid by some form of “shared capitalism”—by which 
we mean proﬁ  t sharing, gain sharing, stock options, or other forms of own-
ership—and they participate in decisions or work in team settings.
3.  Responses to these forms of group incentive pay are largest when they 
trust management and have good employee management relations, and 
when the ﬁ  rm adopts high- performance human resource policies, low levels 
of supervision, and pays ﬁ  xed wages at or above market levels along with 
the incentive pay.
4. Consistent with the theory of free riding, anti-  shirking behavior is 
greater in smaller ﬁ  rms and is particularly strong in small ﬁ  rms with shared 
capitalist pay.
5. Workers in workplaces where there is more anti-  shirking behavior 
report that co- workers work harder and encourage other workers more, and 
that their workplace facility is more eﬀective in several dimensions related 
to productivity and proﬁ  ts.
The bottom line is that “shared capitalist” arrangements—deﬁ  ned broadly 
as those in which ﬁ  rms share rewards and decision-  making with workers—
and positive labor relations encourage workers to act against shirking behav-
ior and thus strengthen the potential for group incentive systems and team 
production to overcome the free rider problem and succeed.
2.1      Group Incentives and Monitoring Colleagues
When will a worker act against a shirking fellow employee?
The natural economics answer is that a worker will so act when it pays 
oﬀ for that person, which almost invariably requires group incentive pay. 
Building on Drago and Garvey (1998), it is easy to show that workers are 
more likely to intervene the higher the amount of the group incentive, the 
higher the probability that intervening increases the performance of the co- 
worker, the lower the cost of intervening (which may depend on individual 
incentives), and the smaller the number of co- workers. In addition, workers 
may gain respect from fellow workers and supervisors, which can translate 
into greater chances of promotion in the future. Workers may discourage 
“shirkers” through peer pressure and nonpecuniary sanctions such as social 
ostracism, personal guilt, or shame (Kandel and Lazear 1992). Since the 1/ N 
problem is smaller at small workplaces, cooperative agreements should be 
easier to establish and maintain in small companies than in large ones.
Workers can also engage in punishing behavior to enforce group norms 
of high eﬀort, and change the behavior of free riders. Punishment may be 
eﬀective in counteracting the free rider eﬀect per the experimental results 80        Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
of Carpenter (2004). He explains his results by noting that an increase in 
the size of a group has two opposing eﬀects: it “forces monitors to spread 
their resources thinner which might lead to more free riding,” but “there are 
also more people monitoring each free rider so it is not obvious whether 
the total amount of punishment each free rider receives will increase or 
decrease” (2004, 4). Prendergast suggests that monitoring with a suﬃciently 
low cost can negate the free rider problem but notes that “empirical evidence 
on peer pressure reveals behavioral responses diﬀerent from those posited 
in the theory”.1
Finally in the workplace setting, management may seek to develop a cor-
porate culture that emphasizes company spirit, promotes group coopera-
tion, encourages social enforcement mechanisms, and so forth in order to 
encourage cooperative actions (Weitzman and Kruse 1990; Blasi, Conte, 
and Kruse 1996; Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003, 226– 28). Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1986) show how the free rider problem can be overcome in an 
ongoing relationship by a cooperative agreement among participants. Using 
artiﬁ  cial agent modeling with small groups, Axelrod (1984) has shown how 
mutual cooperation can develop among agents through reciprocity. Klos 
and Nooteboom (2001) explore the creation of interaction networks that 
have trust as a major component. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) show 
how the performance of an experimental group depends on the eﬀort norms 
established by the group under previous incentive schemes. Knez and Sim-
ester (2001) show how the use of autonomous work groups at Continental 
Airlines helped overcome free riding and encourage mutual monitoring in 
the presence of a company-  wide bonus.2
Whatever model one uses to explain punishment of free riders, work-
ers should be more likely to act against shirkers when they: (a) have some 
ﬁ  nancial interest in the performance of the ﬁ  rm; (b) regularly participate 
in workplace decisions, which should also reduce the cost of speaking out; 
and (c) have trust in management and good labor-  management relations, 
since in those situations, they can reasonably expect the ﬁ  rm to reward 
them for helping to reduce shirking. If you do not trust management, you 
can hardly be expected to report shirking to management. If you regard 
labor-  management relations as poor, you may view shirking as a justiﬁ  able 
response to management’s poor treatment of workers. Financial interest, 
participation in decisions, trust in management, and good labor- labor man-
1. Prendergast (1999) cites Weiss’ study of workers in a pharmaceutical company (1987) 
and Hansen’s examination (1997) of the incentives of telephone operators for a large ﬁ  nancial 
corporation. Both found that group incentives improved the performance of workers who were 
less productive under individual schemes but decreased the performance of more productive 
workers. See also Bailey (1970) and Gaynor and Pauly (1990).
2. Also, Welbourne and Ferranti (2008) ﬁ  nd that managers are more supportive of workers 
reacting to coworkers’ behavior under gain sharing than under traditional merit pay, as indi-
cated by their worker performance ratings.Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    8 1
agement relations should help to create and reinforce norms of reciprocity 
that encourage workers to take action against shirkers.
2.2      New Data on Shirking Detection and Responses
The innovation of our study is the new questions on the nationally rep-
resentative GSS and the NBER company surveys about workers’ ability to 
detect the performance of other workers at their workplace and their actions 
if they observed shirking. (See the “Studying Shared Capitalism” section of 
the Introduction for descriptions of the data sets and limitations.) We asked 
about the ability of workers to observe their peers’ eﬀort because that is a 
necessary precondition for acting against shirking:
In your job how easy is it for you to see whether your co- workers are work-
ing well or poorly? On a scale of 0 to 10 please describe with 0 meaning 
not at all easy to see and 10 meaning very easy to see.
Figure 2.1, panel A, displays the frequency distribution of answers from 
the GSS. The distribution is concentrated at the upper end, with 49 percent 
of workers giving the highest possible answer about the ease of detecting 
how co-  workers are doing, and another 28 percent giving answers in the 7 
through 9 categories. Responses are also bunched at the 0 category as well, 
with 8 percent of workers giving this answer, but otherwise there is a paucity 
of responses at the low end. Thus, the vast majority of workers think they 
have a good idea of how hard their fellow employees are working. Looking 
at which employees report being able to observe co-  workers shows a priori 
sensible variation among employees. Workers who answered with a 7 or 
more to the question reported disproportionately that they work in a team 
as opposed to by themselves, and that they rely on co-  workers and supervi-
sors for help, compared to workers who answered 3 or less on seeing how 
co-  workers perform (data not shown but available). In addition, 13 percent 
who answered 7 or higher reported that they are managers, compared to 7 
percent of those answered 3 or less.
Panel B of ﬁ  gure 2.1 displays the frequency distribution of answers from 
the NBER survey. The largest single group of respondents gave the maxi-
mum answer to their ability to observe their fellow employees, but the dis-
tribution is less concentrated than the distribution in the GSS, with propor-
tionately half as many workers giving the 10 response. Still, 62 percent of 
respondents gave a response of 7 or more to the observability question.
Given that most workers say that they can observe the eﬀort of co- workers, 
what do they do if they catch someone shirking? Our question was:
If you were to see a fellow employee not working as hard or well as he or 
she should, how likely would you be to:
  A. Talk directly to the employee;
  B. Speak to your supervisor or manager;82        Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
  C. Do nothing;
  D. (contained on only some company surveys) Talk about it in a work 
group or team.3
The responses use a four- point scale: not at all likely, not very likely, some-
what likely, and very likely. As a simple way to display the responses to these 
questions, we formed a summated rating anti-  shirking index reﬂ  ecting the 
likelihood of intervention against shirkers using a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 mea-
sures the lowest intervention and 4 the greatest intervention, by simply add-
ing the values of responses across questions (Bartholomew et al. 2002). The 
Fig. 2.1    Distribution of workers by how well they can see whether co-  workers are 
working well or poorly: A, GSS; B, NBER
A
B
3. This option was not included in the 2002 GSS and the early NBER surveys.Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    8 3
anti-  shirking index ranges from 3 to 12 for the observations based on the A 
to C responses and from 4 to 16 for the smaller sample for which we asked 
part D as well. In this ordering a 12 means that the worker reported that 
it was very likely they would talk to the shirking employee and very likely 
that they would talk to the supervisor and not at all likely that they would 
do nothing. A 3 means that they said it was very unlikely they would talk to 
the shirking employee, very unlikely they would talk to the supervisor, and 
very likely they would do nothing.
Figure 2.2, panel A, summarizes the responses from the GSS. It shows that 
the summary statistic diﬀerentiates people in a relatively continuous way. If 
we organize the data into ﬁ  ve bins, grouping the 3 and 4 responses, and the 5 
and 6 responses, and so on, the distribution looks roughly uniform. The anti-
 shirking index has a mean of 7.81 and a standard deviation of 2.94. Panel B 
of ﬁ  gure 2.2 gives the anti-  shirking index for the NBER survey data. With 
the larger sample, the distribution has proportionately more persons in the 
Fig. 2.2    Distribution of anti-  shirking index: A, GSS; B, NBER frequency
B
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middle of the distribution, which gives it a rough normal look. But again, 
there is wide variation. Some people are likely to take action against a shirker 
and some are likely to do little. Our goal is to ﬁ  nd out what diﬀerentiates 
workers in this form of behavior.
Table 2.1 shows for both data sets the proportion of workers who said it 
was likely or not likely that they would take one of the actions in response 
to shirking behavior by a fellow employee. One ﬁ  nding is that more work-
ers in the GSS sample than in the NBER companies say they would be 
“very likely” to take action against shirkers, which would seem to go against 
the idea that shared capitalism encourages anti-  shirking activities; this dif-
ference, however, is primarily due to the larger establishment sizes in the 
NBER sample, and the diﬀerence is reversed when controlling for this and 
other factors distinguishing the samples.4 In addition, the table shows that 
the greater concentration of responses at the upper end of the distribution 
in the GSS than in the NBER data set is due to the great proportion in the 
former who say they would talk to the shirking employee: 32.4 percent in the 
GSS versus 16.7 percent in the NBER data set. In the GSS proportionately 
more workers say that it is very likely that they would talk to an employee 
than would talk to a supervisor or manager, whereas in the NBER data set 
Table 2.1  Potential employee actions against shirkers
Response to fellow worker not working as hard 






Talk about it 




    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
GSS
    Not at all likely 26.0% 28.0% 36.1% 38.8%
  Not  very  likely 17.2% 22.4% 20.3% 20.5%
  Somewhat  likely 24.4% 25.1% 24.0% 17.6%
  Very  likely 32.4% 24.4% 19.7% 23.0%
  n 2,183 2,137 1,058 2,173
NBER
    Not at all likely 28.1% 21.5% 28.6% 36.7%
  Not  very  likely 25.4% 26.8% 26.5% 24.1%
  Somewhat  likely 29.9% 34.8% 31.3% 22.4%
  Very  likely 16.7% 17.0% 13.5% 16.8%
  n   38,228   37,767   29,336   36,979
4. The GSS employees are also younger on average, and more likely to say they can see how 
well their co- workers are working. When these two variables and establishment size are used in 
the GSS sample to predict anti-  shirking, the predicted mean for the NBER sample is less than 
the actual mean, indicating that the NBER employees are generally more likely than would be 
expected to take action against shirkers.Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    8 5
about the same proportion say it is very likely they would talk to the shirker 
as to a manager.5
To move from hypothetical responses to actual behavior, in some com-
pany surveys we added a question, “Have you ever seen one of your fellow 
employees not working as hard or well as he or she should over an extended 
time period?” Over half, 59 percent, of the respondents said yes.6 We then 
asked what they did in response. As seen in table 2.2, 34 percent of the 
employees talked to the shirker, 46 percent talked to a supervisor or manager, 
20 percent talked about it in a work group or team, 5 percent did something 
else, and 29 percent did nothing (row 1). Most important, these answers cor-
relate highly with the respondents’ reported likelihood of taking this action, 
as shown in rows 2 to 5: for example, 82 percent of those who said they were 
very likely to talk to the shirker actually did so, while only 6 percent of those 
who said it was not likely they would talk to the shirker actually did so.
From the tabulations in ﬁ  gures 2.1 and 2.2 and tables 2.1 and 2.2, we 
conclude the following: most workers can tell when a fellow employee is 
5. Since some respondents said that they did not have a supervisor or manager, the sample 
size of answers to that question is smaller than the sample size for the other questions. One 
possible objection to the anti-  shirking index is that it combines disparate behaviors that may 
substitute for each other—for example, a worker may choose between talking to the shirker or 
supervisor but not want to do both. We ﬁ  nd, however, that the responses are highly correlated 
(the alpha for the index is .80 in the GSS data and .69 in the NBER data). We also present 
results for each response separately in table 2.4 and ﬁ  nd results consistent with those using the 
anti- shirking  index.
6. The mean of the anti-  shirking index for the 41 percent of workers who said they have 
not seen a co-  worker shirking is not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from the mean for the 59 percent, 
suggesting that there is no systematic diﬀerence in willingness to take action against shirkers 
between these two groups.






Talk about it 




    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Actions actually taken when saw fellow 
        worker not working as hard or 
        well as he or she shoulda 33.5% 46.0% 20.3% 29.3%
    If said likelihood of this action was:
    Not  at  all  likely 6.1% 12.4% 3.9% 14.8%
    Not  very  likely 13.9% 26.6% 9.1% 17.0%
    Somewhat  likely 54.6% 65.3% 34.0% 41.9%
    Very  likely 81.7% 84.9% 52.8% 72.4%
n   18,744   18,744   18,744   18,744
aWorkers were asked “Have you ever seen one of your fellow employees not working as hard 
or well as he or she should over an extended time period?” The above answers are based on the 
58.6 percent who responded “yes.” They were then asked “What action, if any, did you take?” 
In addition to the actions listed above, 5.2 percent said they would do “something else.”86        Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
shirking or not; there is wide variation in what they will do when faced with 
a situation in which someone shirks; and that this variation reﬂ  ects variation 
in actual past behavior.
2.3      Shared Capitalist Arrangements: Group Incentives and Labor Policies
We have a wide set of measures of the group incentives and labor policies 
that we expect to aﬀect worker responses to shirking behavior. As far as we 
know, ours is the most comprehensive survey of group incentive policies in 
the United States. The overall prevalence of shared capitalist compensation 
is presented in tables 1.1 and 1.3 of chapter 1. The most important result is 
that 45 percent of the for- proﬁ  t private sector employees in the GSS sample 
report participating in some kind of shared capitalism program (36 per-
cent in proﬁ  t sharing, 25 percent in gain sharing, 19 percent in employee 
ownership, and 11 percent in stock options). This gives us good variation 
for examining the relation of these programs to worker outcomes. Regard-
ing other work policies, the 2002 and 2006 GSS asked whether employees 
normally work as part of a team and how often they participate with others 
in determining how things are done at their job. Over half (58 percent) of 
private sector workers report working in a team setting, and 44 percent 
report that they often participate with others in helping set the way things 
are done on a job.
The prevalence of group incentives is necessarily higher in the NBER 
sample, since these ﬁ  rms were selected on the basis of having one or more 
shared capitalism programs. About two- thirds report proﬁ  t sharing (71 per-
cent) and owning company stock (64 percent), while about one-  ﬁ  fth report 
gain sharing (21 percent) and holding stock options (22 percent). The ﬁ  gure 
for working as part of a team (59 percent) is similar to that for the GSS, and 
about one-  third (35 percent) report being part of an employee involvement 
team.
As a ﬁ  rst step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee 
outcomes, we constructed a thermometer-  style index of shared capitalism, 
which assigns points based on coverage by shared capitalism programs and 
the size of the ﬁ  nancial stakes. This index is described in Appendix B. We 
also present results breaking out the diﬀerent forms of shared capitalism 
types and intensities.
2.4      Shared Capitalist Incentives and Shirking
To examine the determinants of anti- shirking behavior, we ﬁ  rst regressed 
the anti- shirking index on organizational/ company policy variables and job 
and demographic factors. As seen in table 2.3, the shared capitalism index is 
linked to greater anti- shirking activity in both the GSS and NBER data sets. 
Among the covariates, the ease of observing co- workers has a strong positive Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    8 7
eﬀect on the anti- shirking index, consistent with the idea that workers will be 
more likely to take action the greater the observability of shirking behavior. 
The participation variables have a substantial positive impact on the anti-
  shirking index in both data sets, as does job security in the NBER data set. 
Job task variety also has a strong positive eﬀect (consistent with Drago and 
Garvey [1998]), indicating that knowledge of how to help is greater, and 
the costs of helping are lower, when the worker has a broader base of skills 
and overlap of tasks with the shirking co- worker. Those who are supervised 
more closely are less likely to engage in anti- shirking behavior in the NBER 
data set, perhaps reﬂ  ecting a belief among closely-  supervised workers that 
dealing with shirking is the supervisor’s responsibility (to be addressed in 
table 2.9). Finally, the data shows that the size of the workplace has a strong 
impact on anti-  shirking behavior, with workers more likely to intervene to 
stop shirking in a smaller workplace, where the shirking of one co- worker is 
more likely to aﬀect them than it would in a larger workplace.
The speciﬁ  c behaviors making up the anti-  shirking index are analyzed 
separately in table 2.4, panels A and B. The shared capitalism index is a 
Table 2.3  Eﬀects of shared capitalism on anti-  shirking index
     GSS data   GSS data   NBER data
Shared capitalism index 0.115 (.035)∗∗∗ 0.072 (0.034)∗∗ 0.027 (0.009)∗∗∗
Ease of seeing how well co-  worker is working 0.086 (.024)∗∗∗ 0.061 (0.024)∗∗ 0.130 (0.005)∗∗∗
Work as part of team 1.060 (.059)∗∗∗ 0.766 (0.157)∗∗∗
High participation in decisions 1.207 (0.153)∗∗∗
Task variety 0.308 (0.103)∗∗∗
Any individual bonuses 0.199 (0.036)∗∗∗
Employee involvement team 0.571 (0.028)∗∗∗
Formal training 0.235 (0.028)∗∗∗
Job security 0.445 (0.037)∗∗∗
How closely supervised –0.013 (0.006)∗∗
Size 1–9 ees. 1.255 (.278)∗∗∗ 1.015 (0.271)∗∗∗
  10–49  ees. 1.211  (.259)∗∗∗ 1.073 (0.250)∗∗∗
  59–99  ees. 0.933  (.280)∗∗∗ 0.858 (0.269)∗∗
  100–999  ees. 0.427  (.244)∗ 0.412 (0.235)
  1,000 ees. (excl.)
n 1,634 1,633 32,099
R2   0.131   0.176   0.192
Notes: The GSS regressions include controls for occupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, 
black, Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full- time status, ln(yearly earnings), and dummy for survey year 
2006. The NBER regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), 
hourly pay status, supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 
dummies), age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number 
of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), and company ﬁ  xed eﬀects. ees.  employees.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.





of talking to 
sup./manager
Likelihood 
of talking in 
work group
    (1)   (2)   (3)
A. GSS
Shared capitalism index 0.038 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.038 (0.014)∗∗∗ –0.011 (0.022)
Ease of seeing how well co-  worker is 
  working 0.033  (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.022 (0.010)∗∗ 0.029 (0.016)∗
Work as part of team 0.426 (0.063)∗∗∗ 0.298 (0.062)∗∗∗ 0.138 (0.099)
Size 1–9 ees. 0.469 (0.112)∗∗∗ 0.448 (0.111)∗∗∗ –0.393 (0.165)∗∗
  10–49  ees. 0.432  (0.104)∗∗∗ 0.417 (0.104)∗∗∗ –0.166 (0.150)
  59–99  ees. 0.293  (0.111)∗∗∗ 0.390 (0.110)∗∗∗ –0.304 (0.163)
    100–999 ees. 0.086 (0.101) 0.208 (0.100)∗∗ 0.007 (0.143)
  1,000 ees. (excl.)
n 1,676 1,641 800
(Pseudo) R2 0.058 0.034 0.019
Cut point 1 0.886 (0.379) –0.020 (0.370) –1.365 (0.562)
Cut point 2 1.407 (0.380) 0.598 (0.371) –0.818 (0.561)
Cut point 3 2.077 (0.382) 1.325 (0.371) –0.094 (0.560)
B. NBER
Shared capitalism index 0.010 (0.004)∗∗ 0.007 (0.004)∗ 0.009 (0.005)∗
Any individual bonuses 0.061 (0.017)∗∗∗ 0.084 (0.017)∗∗∗ 0.050 (0.020)∗∗
Ease of seeing how well co-  worker is 
  working 0.045  (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.057 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.037 (0.003)∗∗∗
Employee involvement team 0.224 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.192 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.195 (0.015)∗∗∗
Formal training 0.146 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.055 (0.013)∗∗∗ 0.065 (0.014)∗∗∗
Job security 0.132 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.206 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.084 (0.019)∗∗∗
How closely supervised 0.002 (0.003) –0.002 (0.003) 0.007 (0.003)∗∗
n 33,807 33,544 25,570
(Pseudo) R2 0.071 0.049 0.022
Cut point 1 0.152 (0.254) 0.198 (0.252) 0.020 (0.664)
Cut point 2 0.907 (0.254) 1.012 (0.252) 0.700 (0.664)
Cut point 3   1.920 (0.255)   2.104 (0.252)   1.715 (0.664)
Notes: (Panel A): the regressions include controls for occupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, 
female, black, Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full-  time status, ln(yearly earnings), and dummy for 
survey year 2006. ees.  employees.
(Panel B): the regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly 
pay status, supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 dum-
mies), age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of 
kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), and company ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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positive predictor of each type of anti-  shirking behavior in both the GSS 
and NBER data, except for the likelihood of talking in a work group in the 
GSS data. It seems that many workers with shared capitalism do not wish 
to talk about the shirker to the group in the shirker’s presence as they might 
ﬁ  nd this embarrassing (consistent with concerns by workers that the shirker 
might resent them or other employees would react poorly, as presented in 
table 2.9).
2.4.1      Types of Shared Capitalism
Which shared capitalism policies are responsible for the results given in 
our indices? Table 2.5 uses diﬀerent types and intensities of shared capital-
Table 2.5  Eﬀects of particular forms of shared capitalist compensation on anti-  shirking index
GSS NBER NBER
    (1)   (2)   (3)
Proﬁ  t and gain sharing
  Proﬁ  t-  sharing or gain-  sharing eligibility 0.344 (0.183)∗ 0.010 (0.040)
  Proﬁ  t-  sharing gain-  sharing bonus as % 
  of  base  pay
0.742 (0.887) 1.424 (0.143)∗∗∗
  Proﬁ  t-  sharing eligibility –0.181 (0.045)∗∗∗
  Proﬁ  t-  sharing bonus as % of base pay 0.596 (0.202)∗∗∗
  Gain-  sharing  eligibility 0.099  (0.056)∗
    Gain-  sharing bonus as % of base pay 0.675 (0.223)∗∗∗
    Individual bonus eligibility 0.250 (0.053)∗∗∗
    Individual bonus as % of base pay –0.480 (0.230)∗∗
Stock options
    Stock option holding 0.237 (0.293) 0.440 (0.075)∗∗∗ –0.043 (0.110)
    Stock option value as % of base pay 0.001 (0.011)
    Stock option grant last year 0.212 (0.108)∗∗
    Stock option grant as % of avg. grant 0.014 (0.023)
Employee ownership
    Co. stock ownership 0.020 (0.298) 0.182 (0.038)∗∗∗ 0.051 (0.042)
    Co. stock as % of base pay 0.141 (0.101) 0.027 (0.018) –0.023 (0.019)
R2 .132 .113 .195
n   1,645   34,379   30,933
Notes: Based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The GSS regression includes controls for oc-
cupation (7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, black, Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full-  time 
status, ln(yearly earnings), co. size (4 dummies), ease of observing co-  workers, and dummy for survey 
year 2006. The NBER regression in column (2) contains the GSS controls from column (1) except co. 
size, plus company and country ﬁ  xed eﬀects. The NBER regression in column (3) includes the controls 
from column (2) plus hourly pay status, supervisory status, hours worked per week, union status, marital 
status (2 dummies), family size, number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), close-
ness of supervision, employee involvement team, training in past year, high job security, and company 
ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.90        Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
ism to predict taking action against shirking. In the GSS data, the most 
important factor behind anti- shirking activity is the presence of proﬁ  t shar-
ing and gain sharing (column [1]). In the NBER data where we actually have 
detailed information on the extent of proﬁ  t sharing, it is the intensity rather 
than the presence of proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing that seems to matter. 
The NBER results in column (2) show a very strong eﬀect of the proﬁ  t-  gain-
 sharing bonus size (not eligibility), along with strong positive eﬀects of stock 
option holding and owning any company stock.
When the richer NBER data are used for a more detailed breakdown 
of shared capitalism in column (3) (along with more extensive controls, 
mirroring the speciﬁ  cation in table 2.3), anti-  shirking activity is strongly 
related to both proﬁ  t- sharing bonus size and gain- sharing bonus size. There 
is one seemingly odd result, however. The negative coeﬃcient on eligibil-
ity combined with the positive coeﬃcient on bonus size indicate that when 
the proﬁ  t share is small, those eligible for proﬁ  t sharing are less likely than 
noneligible employees to take action. As will be seen in table 2.9, shared 
capitalism appears to increase the fear that co-  workers will resent any anti-
 shirking action, so that low levels of proﬁ  t sharing may have a negative eﬀect 
on anti-  shirking activity, but this reluctance is apparently overcome as the 
bonus grows larger. For gain sharing, by contrast, simple eligibility increases 
anti- shirking behavior. On this issue, note that gain- sharing can appear as a 
compact within a speciﬁ  c small group or department within the ﬁ  rm.
Consistent with the results of Drago and Garvey (1998), the eﬀect of 
greater individual bonuses is negative and signiﬁ  cant on anti- shirking behav-
ior (column [3]). Apparently, individual bonuses focus workers on their own 
work and may lead them to see co-  workers as competitors (or at least not 
cooperators). By contrast, workers who received a stock option grant last 
year were more likely to take action against shirkers, although the size of 
the grant, and of one’s holdings, do not seem to make a diﬀerence (column 
[3]). Owning company stock is no longer a signiﬁ  cant predictor in column 
(3), although in supplementary regressions (not reported here) we have posi-
tive associations with some forms of ownership—Employee Stock Purchase 
Plan (ESPP) participation, holding stock after exercising options, holding 
stock purchased on the open market, and Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
(ESOP) membership (this latter result only when company ﬁ  xed eﬀects are 
not used7).
That ownership appears to operate through simply owning stock and not 
the size of one’s stake is consistent with ﬁ  ndings from several other studies 
of higher organizational commitment (reviewed in Kruse and Blasi [1997]). 
7. Company ﬁ  xed eﬀects are probably inappropriate to use in analyzing the eﬀects of ESOP 
membership, since Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) rules provide strict 
guidelines to ensure broad coverage. The small number of non- ESOP members are likely to be 
very diﬀerent from the ESOP members within a ﬁ  rm, and the eﬀects of ESOP membership may 
be better judged by comparing ESOP members to otherwise-  similar workers in other ﬁ  rms.Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    9 1
This suggests that employee ownership may operate largely by changing 
the psychological contract between the employer and employees (Rous-
seau and Shperling 2003), getting employees to think like owners through 
a change in status rather than a change in direct ﬁ  nancial incentives. Such 
incentives may nonetheless be part of the psychological context, since eight 
out of ten of the workers reporting employee ownership in the 2002 GSS 
report they also have some form of proﬁ  t/  gain sharing or stock options, 
which indicates that some managers recognize the value of combining short-
  term rewards and long-  term equity (Blasi, Kruse, and Freeman 2006, 7).
2.4.2    Before/  After  on  Proﬁ  t Sharing
The cross section data presented so far are consistent with the theory that 
shared capitalism aﬀects the response of workers to shirking co- workers but 
cannot rule out the possibility that there are missing variables or other pro-
cesses that aﬀect results. As we were conducting our survey, one ﬁ  rm told 
us that they intended to introduce a new proﬁ  t-  sharing plan which oﬀered 
the chance to conduct a before/ after analysis as well as a cross- section anal-
ysis of worker responses to group incentives. Accordingly, we administered 
our survey twice at this ﬁ  rm, six months apart, with the ﬁ  rst survey coming 
before the ﬁ  rm introduced a new proﬁ  t- sharing plan, and the second survey 
coming after the ﬁ  rm had introduced the new plan.8
As shown in table 2.6, the introduction of the proﬁ  t-  sharing plan led to 
a jump in the percent of employees saying they are eligible for proﬁ  t shar-
ing from 59 percent at the ﬁ  rst survey to 88 percent at the second survey. 
Apart from this, only two variables in the entire survey showed signiﬁ  cant 
changes between the surveys: the percent who say they were very likely to 
talk to a shirking co-  worker (increase from 42 percent to 55 percent), and 
the percent who say that they would do something about a shirker because 
poor performance would hurt the bonus or stock value (from 39 percent to 
56 percent). The fact that these are the only three variables that changed 
between the surveys indicates that there were not compositional changes 
or other policy changes that aﬀected the results. These results lend support 
to the prior ﬁ  ndings, pointing toward a positive eﬀect of proﬁ  t sharing in 
attempts to combat co-  worker shirking.
2.4.3    Complementarities
Analysis of the decision equation for workers to intervene against shirking 
suggests that some of the factors that inﬂ  uence behavior should enter equa-
8. The analyses presented so far use only the responses to the second survey at this company, 
to avoid having more than one survey from some employees. The surveys did not have individual 
identiﬁ  ers so respondents could not be tracked across the two surveys. The higher response rate 
in the second survey is due in part to the provision of a ﬁ  ve- dollar bill accompanying this survey, 
but the surveys appear equally representative since the means on all variables (apart from those 
highlighted in table 2.6) were not signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent between the two surveys.92        Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
tions in an interactive rather than linear way. The worker decides to intervene 
against a shirker when the expected beneﬁ  ts of intervening exceed the costs: 
p (G) – Cost, where p is the probability that the intervention will succeed, 
G is the gain to the worker, and C is the cost. The ﬁ  nancial incentive would 
aﬀect G; participation should aﬀect p and the cost. Labor- management rela-
tions L-  M might aﬀect both G and p. More complicated analyses, in which 
the worker is assumed to take account of the possible behavior of other 
employees, lead to even more complexity, which we will ignore. Instead, we 
have looked for potential interactions among key variables in determining 
anti- shirking  behavior.
Using the nationally representative GSS data, table 2.7 examines how 
shared capitalism interacts with company size, and table 2.8 examines how 
it interacts with other company policies. Shared capitalism is most strongly 
associated with taking action against shirkers in the smallest workplaces, as 
shown in column (1) of table 2.7. The supports the idea that the 1/ N problem 
will be lower in smaller workplaces (note that the base estimates continue to 
show more anti-  shirking activity among workers in small companies with-
Table 2.6  Longitudinal evidence: Two waves of same company
2004 
(proﬁ  t sharing 
announced)
2005 
(proﬁ  t sharing 
in place)
    (1)   (2)   Change
Proﬁ  t sharing 58.6% 87.9% 29.2%∗∗∗
Very/somewhat likely to take action against 
  shirker
    Talk to shirking employee 42.1% 54.5% 12.4%∗∗∗
    Talk to supervisor or manager 64.3% 68.1% 3.9%
    Talk about it in work group 47.3% 48.8% 1.5%
  Do  nothing 34.1% 33.7% –0.4%
Why you are likely to take action
    I like helping others 47.4% 49.6% 2.3%
    Employee might help me in the future 30.6% 33.5% 2.9%
    Poor performance will cost me and other 
    employees in bonus or stock value
38.8% 56.1% 17.3%∗∗∗
    Other employees appreciate it when  
  someone  steps  forward
34.3% 34.4% 0.1%
    Want to keep work standards high 59.3% 59.6% 0.3%
    Employee’s poor performance could aﬀect 
  my  own  job
57.1% 56.3% –0.8%
  Other  (What?) 14.2% 10.0% –4.2%
n   273   428    
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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out shared capitalism, indicating that shirking may be perceived as more 
of an economic threat in small enterprises generally). The shared capitalist 
index eﬀect is also signiﬁ  cant in the next two larger size classes, and positive 
(although not signiﬁ  cant) in the two largest classes. (As noted in chapter 
1, the greater prevalence of shared capitalism in larger establishments may 
be explained in part by ﬁ  xed costs in setting up these plans.) An equally 
or even more important factor in taking action against shirkers, however, 
Table 2.7  Company size and employee-  management relations as moderators of 
shared capitalism
GSS data NBER data
    (1)   (2)   (3)
Shared cap. index ∗ co. size of:
  1–9  ees. 0.281  (0.085)∗∗∗
  10–49  ees. 0.117  (0.068)∗
  59–99  ees. 0.195  (0.085)∗∗
  100–999  ees. 0.029  (0.057)
  2,000 ees. 0.045 (0.076)
Shared cap. index ∗ mgt. is trustworthy
    Strongly disagree (D or F in col. [3]) 0.043 (0.165) 0.048 (0.014)∗∗∗
    Disagree (C in col. [3]) 0.117 (0.072) –0.001 (0.013)
    Agree (B in col. [3]) 0.083 (0.048)∗ 0.014 (0.010)
    Strongly agree (A in col. [3]) 0.179 (0.064)∗∗∗ 0.054 (0.013)∗∗∗
Mgt. is trustworthy:
  Strongly  disagree  (excl.)
    Disagree 0.057 (0.181) –0.053 (0.414) 0.499 (0.064)∗∗∗
    Agree –0.249 (0.210) 0.122 (0.374) 0.710 (0.065)∗∗∗
    Strongly agree –0.199 (0.313) 0.208 (0.398) 0.838 (0.081)∗∗∗
Size 1–9 ees. 0.855 (0.345)∗∗ 1.179 (0.283)∗∗∗
  10–49  ees. 1.005  (0.336)∗∗∗ 1.143 (0.259)∗∗∗
    59–99 ees. 0.585 (0.366) 0.885 (0.281)∗∗∗
    100–999 ees. 0.403 (0.317) 0.407 (0.244)∗
  1,000 ees. (excl.)
n 1,631 1,627 31,770
(Pseudo) R2   0.137   0.132   0.205
Notes: Dependent variable  anti-  shirking index. The GSS regression includes controls for occupation 
(7 dummies), age, years of tenure, female, black, Hispanic, education (4 dummies), full-  time status, 
ln(yearly earnings), ease of observing co-  workers, work as part of team, and dummy for survey year 
2006. The NBER regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), 
hourly pay status, supervisory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 
dummies), age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, num-
ber of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), employee involvement team, training in past 
year, job security, ease of observing co-  workers, closeness of supervision, individual bonuses, and com-
pany ﬁ  xed eﬀects. ees.  employees.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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appears to be the quality of the relationship with management. As shown in 
column (2), shared capitalism is associated with anti-  shirking activity most 
strongly when combined with a high level of trust in management. While 
this could simply reﬂ  ect column (1)’s ﬁ  nding of a more positive eﬀect in 
small companies, the results in column (2) are maintained when the small-
est companies are deleted (not shown here). Similar results are obtained 
when shared capitalism is interacted with the view of employee- management 
relations.9 These results indicate that employees are likely to take action to 
increase productivity only when they are conﬁ  dent that any gains will in fact 
be shared with workers. This suggests that large companies can use improved 
employee-  management relations to counteract the 1/  N problem.10
Table 2.8  Company policies as moderators of shared capitalism
      (1)   (2)  
Shared capitalism index 0.028 (0.010)∗∗∗ –0.018 (0.018)
Employee involvement team 0.544 (0.030)∗∗∗
Formal training 0.232 (0.029)∗∗∗
Job security 0.431 (0.040)∗∗∗
High perf. policy index 0.259 (0.030)∗∗∗
∗shared capitalism index 0.035 (0.006)∗∗∗
How closely supervised –0.014 (0.006)∗∗ 0.030 (0.010)∗∗∗
∗shared capitalism index –0.013 (0.002)∗∗∗
Fixed pay at or above market 0.181 (0.028)∗∗∗ 0.043 (0.050)
∗shared capitalism index 0.034 (0.010)∗∗∗
n 28,424 28,424
  (Pseudo) R2   0.193   0.194  
Notes: Dependent variable  anti-  shirking index. Based on NBER data. The regressions in-
clude controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, super-
visory status, years of tenure, hours worked per week, union status, country (27 dummies), 
age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number 
of kids, race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), ease of observing co-  workers, indi-
vidual bonuses, and company ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
9. The correlation between trust in management and view of employee management relations 
is .60, indicating they appear to represent a common attitude.
10. We examined other ways in which shared capitalism arrangements may interact with 
workplace policies. The positive shared capitalism eﬀect on the likelihood of taking action 
against shirkers is lower among those who plan to look for a new job in the next year (pre-
sumably because they will not be around to receive the proﬁ  t share), and in companies with 
high injury rates (which could worsen management employee relations and decrease expected 
tenure). While some models predict that ﬁ  nancial participation will have a positive interaction 
with participation in decision-  making in aﬀecting worker motivation and performance (e.g., 
Ben-  Ner and Jones 1995), we do not ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant interactions using the GSS participation Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    9 5
This result does not, however, carry over to within-  company compari-
sons in the NBER data. The most positive eﬀect of shared capitalism on 
anti-  shirking activity still occurs among employees with the most trust in 
management, but the shared capitalism index has a positive eﬀect even when 
the NBER employees disagree that management is trustworthy. We do not 
have a ready explanation for the diﬀerence between the two data sets. Be-
cause almost all employees in the GSS sample work in diﬀerent companies, 
we do not know if the positive interaction between shared capitalism and 
employee- management relations in that data set reﬂ  ects the eﬀect of compa-
nies with good employee- management relations in general, or of individuals 
who perceive good relations within a company (even if their co-  workers do 
not). We did some exploration of company and individual diﬀerences in 
the NBER data and found that anti-  shirking behavior is generally strong in 
companies with higher average grades of employee-  management relations 
and trust in management, no matter the individual employee’s grades of 
these items. This suggests the importance of company culture in fostering 
an environment encouraging peer pressure.
The role of complementary company policies is explored with the NBER 
data in table 2.8. Column (1) essentially replicates the speciﬁ  cation from 
table 2.3, adding a control for the worker’s perception that his or her ﬁ  xed 
pay is at or above market level. The strong positive eﬀect of the wage vari-
able is consistent with eﬃciency wage theories, which posit that worker 
performance can be improved through better pay. The negative eﬀect of 
close supervision suggests that the gift exchange version of eﬃciency wage 
theory is more relevant than the shirking version, since in the shirking ver-
sion close monitoring should have positive eﬀects on worker behavior. The 
shared capitalism index remains a positive predictor as the wage variable is 
introduced. The eﬀect appears to be contingent, however, on other work-
place policies. The shared capitalist index has a strong positive interaction 
with a high performance policy index (column [2]), supporting the idea of 
complementarities among these policies in aﬀecting worker behavior.11 The 
shared capitalist index also has a strong negative interaction with closeness 
of supervision, and a positive interaction with having ﬁ  xed pay at or above 
market level. The negative supervision interaction may reﬂ  ect a negative 
reaction to the mixed message received by workers: we want you to work 
measures (which are subjective and may mediate the eﬀects of shared capitalism). Further, we 
did not ﬁ  nd that employee stock ownership or holding stock options alone were related to anti-
  shirking behavior. This is consistent with the research literature and our ﬁ  ndings in this and 
related papers in the NBER project that employee ownership and stock options generally inter-
act with company culture in impacting performance, although there is evidence that employee 
ownership directly improves commitment. Also, as noted, it is possible that some managers 
combine proﬁ  t sharing and equity participation in order to get synergy between them.
11. These results showing the value of embedding such participation in a system of high 
performance work policies are consistent with the analysis of Appelbaum et al. (2000) and 
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harder due to company-  based pay, but we are nonetheless going to watch 
you very closely. In this case the shared capitalism might be perceived by 
workers as primarily risk- sharing. The positive interaction with having ﬁ  xed 
pay at or above the market level may reﬂ  ect a more positive response by 
workers when the company seems to be truly sharing, and not asking the 
worker to sacriﬁ  ce pay levels in exchange for shared capitalist incentives. 
Forms of employee ownership that are combined with below-  market pay 
might not be optimal for anti-  shirking behavior because the incentive is 
diluted through what workers perceive as wage substitution.
These interaction results for supervision and high-  performance policies 
are illustrated in ﬁ  gure 2.3. This ﬁ  gure shows how there is a positive relation 
between shared capitalism and the anti-  shirking index only when there are 
high-  performance policies and average or low levels of supervision. Other-
wise the relationship is negative.
Thus, incentive intensity is strongly related to anti-  shirking activity, but 
appears to work best as part of a high-  performance work system where 
workers are paid well and not supervised too closely. These results are con-
sistent with the ﬁ  ndings of Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) that 
workplace productivity is improved by combining several high- performance 
human resource policies, and show that worker response to shirkers is likely 
an important mechanism in the higher productivity.
Fig. 2.3    The contingent eﬀects of shared capitalism on anti-  shirking activityWorker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    9 7
2.4.4      Reasons For/  Against Acting Against Shirkers
The dynamics underlying taking action against shirkers are explored more 
fully in table 2.9, which records employee responses to questions about why 
they might or might not do something about a shirking co-  worker. These 
questions were asked on only some of our company surveys. Over half of 
workers said they would be likely to do something because the employee’s 
performance could aﬀect their own jobs (56 percent), reﬂ  ecting interdepen-
Table 2.9 Why people do/do not act against shirkers
Position in shared 
capitalisma
Coeﬃcient 
on SC indexb All Lower Middle Upper
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Why you might do something
    I like helping others 44.9% 47.2% 43.2% 42.8% 0.001
    Employee might help me in the future 31.0% 32.0% 30.5% 29.7% 0.003
    Poor performance will cost me and other 
    employees in bonus or stock value 42.9% 32.0% 48.5% 58.2% 0.038∗∗∗
    Other employees appreciate it when 
  someone  steps  forward 23.9% 19.9% 24.9% 32.0% 0.008∗∗∗
    Want to keep work standards high 46.6% 41.6% 46.6% 58.9% 0.015∗∗∗
    Employee’s poor performance could aﬀect 
  my  own  job 55.9% 53.2% 56.9% 61.3% 0.010∗∗∗
  Other  (What?) 6.8% 5.7% 7.0% 8.9% 0.003∗∗∗
n 32,386 13,991 12,514 5,463
Why you might do nothing
    Employee not working well would resent it 41.3% 37.9% 43.2% 44.7% 0.015∗∗∗
    Other employees would react poorly 23.4% 24.3% 23.3% 21.8% 0.000
    It’s the supervisor’s job, not mine 44.7% 45.0% 46.8% 39.7% 0.001
    Some other employee will probably take 
  action 8.4% 10.5% 7.2% 6.1% 0.000
  There’s  no  ﬁ  nancial beneﬁ  t for me 7.7% 10.2% 6.6% 4.9% –0.003∗∗∗
    Nothing in it for me personally 11.0% 13.3% 10.1% 8.0% –0.003∗∗
  Other  (What?) 12.4% 8.8% 13.3% 19.0% 0.007∗∗∗
n   30,363   12,236   12,284   5,444    
Note: Based on NBER data.
aShared capitalism index of 5 or greater  “upper,” 3 to 4  “middle,” and 0 to 2  “lower.”
bBased on linear probability models predicting whether employee checked this reason, controlling for 
ease of observing co-  worker, closeness of supervision, occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), 
hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per week, union status, age, gender, 
marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 dum-
mies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), and company ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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dent work where cooperation can be especially productive. Almost half of 
workers said they would do something because they would want to keep 
work standards high (47 percent), which can be seen as reﬂ  ecting a coop-
erative solution to reinforce high work norms. Almost as many workers ex-
pressed a ﬁ  nancial incentive, saying the poor performance would lead to 
lower bonus or stock value (43 percent), while 45 percent said they simply 
like helping others, and 31 percent said the employee might help them in 
the future.
The responses are related to the level of participation in shared capitalism. 
For example, the percent saying that poor performance would lead to lower 
bonus or stock value is almost twice as high among those with a high value 
on the shared capitalism index (58 percent in column [4]) relative to those 
with a low value on the index (32 percent in column [2]). Similarly, the former 
group is more likely to say they would do it to keep work standards high (59 
percent compared to 42 percent). Column (5) shows that the shared capital-
ism index is a strong predictor of ﬁ  ve of the reasons for taking action.12
The predominant reason for not taking action against shirkers is that it 
is seen as the supervisor’s job (45 percent), followed closely by the fear that 
the shirking employee would resent it (41 percent). About one-  fourth (23 
percent) feared that other employees would react poorly, while less than 
one-  tenth (8 percent) directly expressed free ridership by saying that some 
other employee would probably take action. The shared capitalism index 
is a strong predictor of the fear that the shirking employee would resent 
the action, perhaps because the intervener would be seen as acting out of a 
ﬁ  nancial concern rather than out of concern for the worker. As noted earlier, 
this may help explain why very low levels of proﬁ  t sharing appear to be asso-
ciated with reduced likelihood of taking action against shirkers—an eﬀect 
that is more than counterbalanced by other reasons as the bonus size grows. 
The shared capitalist index also, not surprisingly, predicts a lower likelihood 
that the employee will say there is no ﬁ  nancial beneﬁ  t or “nothing in it for 
me personally” (column [5]). Therefore these data are consistent with the 
idea that shared capitalism can aﬀect worker behavior.
2.4.5      Outcomes of Anti-  Shirking Activity
What happened as a result of the action? The data in table 2.10 point 
up one of the dangers of taking action, as one-  third (35 percent) of the 
workers said that the employee who was not working well resented it. The 
12. One possible objection to our focus on shared capitalism is that there are many reasons 
workers take action against shirkers, as shown in this table. Of course, workers report and 
probably have a variety of reasons—which may also include simply noticing incompetence, as 
noted by Eric Maskin in discussing our chapter—and we do not pretend that workers have the 
simple motive of “anti- shirking” in their minds, or that shared capitalism is the only motivator. 
These results show that shared capitalism is not related to two of the key reasons for taking 
action (“I like helping others” and “Employee may help me in the future”), but is clearly related 
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most likely outcome, however, was that other employees appreciated the 
action (45 percent), while almost as many said the supervisor appreciated it 
(40 percent), and just over one-  third said that the employee’s performance 
improved (36 percent).
Does it help economic performance? Only a minority of workers report 
that the employee’s performance improved, but this may still be enough 
to make a diﬀerence in workplace performance. Also, apart from actual 
anti-  shirking actions, people may work harder simply knowing that their 
co-  workers are likely to do something if they see signs of shirking. We do 
not have hard performance data, but we do have several survey measures 
of co-  worker and facility performance that show a strong relationship with 
our anti- shirking measures. Table 2.11 shows that those who report a higher 
likelihood of talking to a shirker, and a lower likelihood of doing nothing, 
rate their co- workers’ eﬀort higher on a 0 to 10 scale. The anti- shirking index 
is very strongly related not just to this measure, but also to a perception that 
workers tend to encourage each other, and to ratings of the facility on ﬁ  ve 
speciﬁ  c measures of performance. Since several of these measures involve 
workers reporting on the behavior of others, it lessens the probability that 
that the interveners are putting a good spin on their behavior by reporting 
higher performance, as one reviewer has cautioned. To check the possibil-
ity that this simply reﬂ  ects individual characteristics (e.g., greater optimism 
about company performance among those who say they would take action 
against shirkers), we also calculated these relationships at the site level and 
found that worksites with higher average scores on the anti-  shirking index 
also had signiﬁ  cantly higher average evaluations of workplace performance. 
This is illustrated in ﬁ  gure 2.4 for one of our performance measures (evalu-
ations of co- workers’ performance).13 Therefore, this does not simply reﬂ  ect 
Table 2.10  Responses to anti-  shirking actions
    Yes (%)   No (%)  
Don’t 
know (%)   n
What was the outcome of your actions?
    Employee not working well resented it 34.7 19.1 46.2 14,125
    Other employees appreciated it 45.0 11.4 43.6 13,676
  Supervisor  appreciated  it 40.1 15.5 44.4 13,845
    Employee not working well improved 35.7 38.9 25.4 14,254
  Other   28.3    9.9   61.8    2,923
Notes: Based on NBER data. Workers were asked “Have you ever seen one of your fellow 
employees not working as hard or well as he or she should over an extended time period?” If 
yes, they were then asked “What action, if any, did you take?” Those who reported taking 
some action (see table 2.2) were then asked the above question about the outcome.
13. We also ﬁ  nd that site-  level averages of the anti-  shirking index are strongly related to 
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an individual reporting phenomenon: shared views of higher performance 
in a workplace are related to shared commitments to take action against 
shirkers. It appears that the propensity for anti-  shirking activity does make 
a diﬀerence in performance.
One possible objection to these ﬁ  ndings is that some production processes 
are diﬃcult to supervise by managers so that work is arranged to rely on 
peer intervention. Shared capitalism may be used not to encourage anti-
  shirking behavior, but directly to deter shirking, so that peer intervention 
and shared capitalism are both consequences of technologies rather than 
causally related to each other. Our pre/ post results in table 2.6 go against this 
explanation. We also tested this by examining the relationship in diﬀerent 
industries, and by controlling for detailed manufacturing technologies (in 
our diversiﬁ  ed multinational ﬁ  rm with diverse technologies such as plastics 
and aerospace). The shared capitalism eﬀect does not disappear, but in fact 
gets slightly stronger with more detailed controls for production technol-
Table 2.11  Relation of anti-  shirking behavior to co-  worker performance
A Average ratings of co-  worker eﬀort (0–10 scale)
Anti- shirking  action
      Talk to shirker   Talk to sup./man.   Do nothing  
Not at all likely 6.7 6.8 7.2
Not very likely 7.0 7.1 7.1
Somewhat likely 7.3 7.2 7.0
  Very likely   7.5   7.1   6.6  
B Anti-  shirking index as predictor of workplace performance
Dependent variable  
Summated 
rating 
coeﬃcient   (s.e.)   T or Z   n
Rating of co-  worker eﬀort (0–10 scale, OLS) 0.109 (0.004) 25.24 35,637
Workers encourage each other (–1, 0, 1, ordered probit) 0.135 (0.005) 27.14 12,659
Grade of facility performance (0–4 scale, OLS):
    A. Getting the job done that has to get done eﬃciently 0.050 (0.002) 21.12 22,810
  B.  Practicing  accountability 0.066 (0.003) 23.32 22,705
    C. Delivering customers’ products on time 0.021 (0.003) 7.68 22,700
    D. Delivering highest quality customer products 0.044 (0.003) 17.69 22,704
    E. Being the market leader in its products   0.032   (0.003)   13.18   22,569
Note: Based on NBER data. s.e.  standard error.
bottom of table 2.11) and employee loyalty to the organization, although there is no strong 
relationship to site-  level averages of willingness to work hard and turnover intention. For one 
large multinational, the data set has a number of hard operational measures of eﬃciency, but 
only at an aggregate division level, which makes analysis problematic.Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism    1 0 1
ogies, making us more conﬁ  dent that anti-  shirking intentions and behavior 
are a result of shared capitalism and company culture.14
2.5    Conclusion
This study has examined employee responses to new questions on the 
2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys and a large database of more detailed 
NBER employee surveys on whether workers can easily observe whether 
co-  workers are shirking and how workers respond to shirking. The answers 
to the new questions provide valuable insight into the likely magnitude of 
mutual monitoring and peer pressure against shirking behavior. They show 
that most workers believe that they are able to observe the eﬀort/ activity  of 
fellow workers, which is the ﬁ  rst prerequisite for mutual monitoring and peer 
Fig. 2.4    Anti-  shirking and worker eﬀort at site level
14. One limitation of our study is the lack of a measure of shirking per se. However, we did 
ask each employee in two companies to respond on a 1 to 5 scale whether “There are days when 
I don’t put much eﬀort into my job.” Analysis of this variable indicates that workers reporting 
high eﬀort are the ones who are more likely to intervene against shirkers. Moreover, there is no 
direct relationship between the shared capitalism index and increased individual eﬀort. This 
reﬂ  ects the ﬁ  nding that the principal impact of shared capitalism appears to work in combina-
tion with various aspects of company culture such as trust, high performance work systems, 
and ﬁ  xed wages at or above market. This suggests that neither shared capitalism alone nor 
unique production systems dependent on technologies are creating anti- shirking work systems, 
but rather that shared capitalism enhances anti-  shirking together with company culture, and 
shared capitalism and positive company culture also impact the potential shirker’s level of 
eﬀort. These additional analyses are available from the authors.102        Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
pressure against shirking to work. In addition, about half of the workforce 
says that they would be very likely to respond to poor job performance 
by co-  workers, with more saying that they would talk to the shirker rather 
than reporting the behavior to management. While there are some demo-
graphic correlates to responding against shirking, workplace factors are 
more strongly related to employee eﬀorts to reduce shirking. This conﬂ  icts 
with the claim that broad- based incentives will be weak for everyone because 
of free riding.15
Employees respond more against shirking in workplaces with shared 
capitalism institutions, and the ﬁ  ndings suggest important complementari-
ties between shared capitalism and high-  performance policies, supervision 
intensity, and being paid at least the market wage.
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